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Abstract 
From the later 1860s to 1891, King Norodom reorganised the Cambodian fiscal system 
along increasingly central lines, transforming almost all existing taxes and duties into 
royal revenue farms, including rights previously not vested in the throne. Norodom 
succeeded by exploiting weaknesses in the early French protectorate regime, and 
because diasporic Chinese invested their capital and labour in operating his fiscal 
system. If some Chinese businessmen accrued great wealth from these activities, the 
Chinese community of Cambodia generally paid a high price by forfeiting their age-old 
easy relations with ordinary Khmer people for whom they increasingly became the ugly 
public face of the royal revenue farming system. 
 
Introduction1 
The economic history of nineteenth-century Cambodia is still only understood in the 
most general terms, something that is certainly true of the royal revenue farming system 
created by King Norodom I. Revenue farming elsewhere in nineteenth-century South-
east Asia tended to flourish during a transitional stage of state development in which 
rulers, whether colonial or indigenous, rented out the monopoly right for the collection of 
certain types of state or royal revenues to private entrepreneurs, in return for stipulated 
payments. Revenue farms, often auctioned to the highest bidder, were usually set up to 
tax articles of consumption that existing bureaucratic structures would have found very 
difficult, or even impossible, to access successfully. The annual fees paid by the 
monopolists, mostly Chinese, in turn helped fund the administrative and other reforms 
which facilitated the emergence of modern, bureaucratic state structures in places as 
diverse as Thailand and Singapore.2 This was not the case in Cambodia. 
When Constance Wilson considered the fiscal system of nineteenth-century Siam, 
for example, and the role of revenue farming in it, she described three distinct systems, 
each with its own administrative arrangements and histories. First was a system of 
population registration under “masters” (nai), which organised corvee labour or the 
collection of forest products; second was the direct collection of taxes by royal officials; 
and third was revenue farming, by which the rights to collect mainly consumption taxes 
were auctioned to the highest bidder.3 The Cambodian fiscal system at the start of 
Norodom’s rule was not dissimilar. Wilson nominated tax farming as the Siamese 
government’s “major source of revenue after 1850”,4 something equally true in 
Norodom’s Cambodia. In 1862, Andrew Spooner, a French businessman who surveyed 
the Cambodian economy on behalf of the colonial government of Cochinchina, reported 
that Chinese-operated revenue farms on opium and gambling were the state’s main 
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 Unedited version uploaded by error in 2007 and replaced by fully proof-read version in September 2008.   
1
 This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Second Water Frontier workshop, Phuket, Thailand, 18-
19 February 2006. Many thanks to the Australian Research Council for the funding that made it possible to 
work in the colonial archives. 
2
 For a discussion of the phenomenon, and numerous case studies, the classic text is The Rise and Fall of 
Revenue Farming. Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia, ed. John 
Butcher and Howard Dick (London: St Martin’s Press, 1993), passim. 
3
 For a more detailed analysis of the Thai system, see Hong Lysa, Thailand in the Nineteenth Century 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 1985), Ch 4. 
4
 Constance M. Wilson, “Revenue Farming, Economic Development and Government Policy during the Early 
Bangkok Period, 1830-92”, in Revenue Farming, pp.143-8, quote p. 148. 
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source of revenue, together yielding 150,000 piastres a year.5 But whereas Chakkri 
kings used their growth taxes in considerable part to fund the modernising 
reorganisation of the Thai state, nothing similar happened in Cambodia. There the 
much poorer local society had to endure a rapaciously expanding and centralising 
revenue farming system whose only beneficiaries for over a generation were the king, 
his court favourites, and a comparatively small number of speculators in monopolies, 
mainly Chinese, sometimes Khmer, but also occasionally European or Malay. While 
Cambodia may not have sprouted revenue farms in the same profusion as Siam, by 
1881 their yield accounted for 87 percent of Norodom’s official revenue of 48,500 silver 
bars (or about four million francs).6 This amount, it is worth noting, had already soared 
by over two-thirds since 1873.7 Yet despite the dramatic rise in revenue collected, 
rather than help fund the transition to a more effective state structure, as had happened 
in seventeenth-century Europe and nineteenth-century Siam, Norodom’s fiscal system 
actually forestalled any such change until after 1892, when the king finally accepted a 
colonial civil list in exchange his rights in revenue farms.  
This article uses French colonial archival sources to explore the development of the 
royal revenue farming system in Norodom’s Cambodia, under nominal French 
protection since 1863, and the role of Chinese revenue farmers and sub-farmers in it. It 
begins with a brief overview of the situation in the mid-nineteenth century. 
 
Mid-Nineteenth-Century Cambodia 
When Cambodian king Ang Duang died in 1860, his thirteen-year reign had seen one of 
the longest periods of internal peace in the kingdom for almost a century. Since the 
1770s, Cambodia had been repeatedly savaged by Thai and Vietnamese invaders, and 
by bloody internal strife. In the 1790s, Siam had sponsored the dismemberment of the 
populous Battambang–Siem Reap region, with its iconic Angkor treasures; while from 
the 1810s the revitalised Nguyễn state in neighbouring Vietnam had increasingly 
imposed its sway over a Khmer realm that by then had shrunk to little more than 
modern riverine eastern Cambodia.8 But the peace following Ang Duang’s accession 
was largely one of exhaustion; in 1847 much of the kingdom was a smashed ruin. Many 
of its surviving people had been scattered or deported to Siamese territory, leaving 
deserted villages and vandalised monasteries in the bitter aftermath of Hue’s 
catastrophic mid-1830s bid to transform the Cambodian kingdom into Vietnam’s 
Western Protectorate, “Trấn Tây”. It had required a convulsive, last ditch countrywide 
effort by the Khmer people, with support from a Thai army and from many locally-
resident Chinese, who resented Vietnamese attempts to organise their lives, to bleed 
away Hue’s will and ability to hold “Trấn Tây” in the early 1840s.9 Even so, the costly 
                                                 
5
 “Rapport sur le Cambodge. Voyage de Sai-gon à Bat-tam-bang”, 30 December 1862, p. 2 of typescript 
archival copy. The document is held in the Archives d’Outre-Mer, Indochine at Aix-en-Provence [hereafter 
AOMI], Fonds amiraux, 12705. It is translated fully in the “Research Materials” section of this journal. 
6
 For the figures, see the report of 13 November 1881, AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 10169. For the share derived 
from revenue farms, see Table One below. 
7
 This figure is a little problematic. I have subtracted the personal revenues of various dignitaries from the total 
given by Jean Moura in his exhaustive list of all Cambodian revenues for that year. It gives the king’s share as 
2,802,670 francs, or about 28,000 silver bars, using an estimated rate of 100 francs per silver tael that is 
documented for 1875. However, the number of bars might have been a little lower at the time, as the franc 
appreciated considerably against silver in these years. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 12634. The figure was about 
80,000 piastres higher than Spooner’s 1862 estimate. 
8
 The rivers were the Tonle Sap and the southern arm of its Great Lake, the Mekong, and the Bassac. The 
only economically significant area outside this general region was Pursat province. The southern coastal zone 
around Kampot formed part of Vietnamese-controlled Hà Tiên province until 1847.  
9
 For the first half of the nineteenth century generally, see David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 2nd ed. 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993), Ch 7. For the situation in 1847, see Khin Sok, L’Annexion du Cambodge 
par les Vietnamiens au XIXe siècle d’après les deux poèmes du Vénérable Bâtum Baramey Pich (Paris: 
Éditions You-Feng, 2002), especially. pp. 88-89. For Chinese participation in the 1841 uprising and 
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victory only succeeded in reinstating the earlier, uneasy system of shared suzerainty 
over Cambodia between Siam and Vietnam. 
Reconstruction was painfully slow. Early the nineteenth century, Phnom Penh had 
been Cambodia’s bustling central market, with goods transported for sale there from all 
over the country. Phnom Penh had also attracted commodities from Siamese-
dominated Battambang, the upriver Lao states, from Chinese or Sino–Khmer cash crop 
plantations among the fertile Mekong islands or river banks, and from the huge wooded 
regions of the interior, where local peoples or itinerant Chinese gathered valuable forest 
products for export to Chinese and Southeast Asian markets. A Vietnamese report of 
the later 1830s had rhapsodised about these local specialities and the profits generated 
by their trade:10 
 
Herbal medicines, ebony, trắc wood, calambac,11 rhinoceros horn, elephant tusks, 
southern ginseng, cardamom, sha nhon,12 and pepper are the best known, but there are 
countless other products like coconut oil, lacquer, purple ants, yellow wax, etc. . . . 
Merchants come here to trade for local products and make big profits. That is why many 
merchants from Lục Tỉnh [the six province of southern Vietnam] come here.  
 
People in the Phnom Penh area had lived well in earlier times, too. Malay or Cham 
shopkeepers along the riverbank had sold a rich profusion of Chinese and local goods 
to a mixed population of Chinese, Vietnamese, Khmer, and Sino-Khmer. There were 
“hundreds and thousands of boats along the river. At sunset the sound of the Hu violin13 
and Shang flute14 [would] float out over the river under the moonlight.15 The people here 
[were] rich, and tend[ed] to spend extravagantly on women, wine, and gambling”, the 
anonymous Vietnamese report added.16 But by 1847, Siamese forces had razed 
Phnom Penh twice, in 1833 and again in the early 1840s. Only a shadow of its former 
importance remained. As late as 1862, when Andrew Spooner passed through with a 
French expedition exploring upriver north to Laos and west to Battambang, he 
described the town as having previously contained “numerous brick habitations covered 
in tiles”, but added “almost all were destroyed during the last wars, and bamboo huts 
have replaced them”.17 If Chinese had continued to trade in Ang Duang’s Cambodia, 
both on their own account or for commercial houses in Cholon, and even Singapore,18 
and some thousands lived in Phnom Penh, it would be twenty years after Norodom 
moved his court there in 1866 before its reconstruction would began in earnest.  
Ang Duang was well aware of his realm’s precariousness. He had spent long years 
in exile in Bangkok, where he had eked out his meagre portion by learning to repair 
watches and clocks, and where he had developed a fascination with Europe that so 
impressed the French missionary, Charles-Émile Bouillevaux, when they met in the 
early 1850s. Aware of a wider world from his Siamese sojourn, Ang Duang hoped to 
                                                                                                                                   
subsequent fighting, see Choi Byung Wook, Southern Vietnam under the Reign of Minh Mạnh (1820-1841) 
(Ithaca: Cornell SEAP, 2004), pp. 152-53.  
10
 “Trấn Tây Phong Thổ Ký” [hereafter TTPTK], in Chu dụ chí tập biên [A Collection of writings on geography], 
Han-Nôm Viện, Hanoi, shelf no. Vhv 1729. Text translated by Li Tana, annotated by Li Tana and Nola Cooke. 
It is printed in full on pp. 148–53 of this journal. Page references in this article refer to that translation. For the 
quote, see  p. 149 below. 
11
 A valuable form of aromatic aloes-wood used widely in north Asia.  
12
 A Chinese medical product very similar to cardamom. 
13
 A Chinese stringed instrument originating in the Middle East. 
14
 A traditional Chinese bamboo instrument. The term “Shang” is used here to balance the word “Hu”. 
15
 This probably refers to the use of pleasure boats on the water. 
16
 TTPTK, p. 150. 
17
  Spooner, “Rapport sur le Cambodge”, p. 13. 
18
 Ibid. Malays had also engaged in import–export trade, but the recent rebellion of Malayo–Cham people may 
have caused them to flee for safety in 1862. See Charles-Émile Bouillevaux, Voyage dans l’Indochine, 1848-
1856 (Paris: Victor Palmé, 1858), p. 200 for the involvement of Malay merchants in the early- to mid-1850s 
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persuade some European power to become his kingdom’s protector, and secretly 
summonsed French missionaries from Cochinchina to assist in his plan.19 Although little 
of substance ensued in Ang Duang’s lifetime, French Cochinchinese authorities did 
negotiate a protectorate treaty with his successor, Norodom, in August 1860. But the 
infant colony’s own troubles at that time meant the treaty had effectively remained void.  
After Hue formally ceded three eastern Cochinchinese provinces in 1862, French 
interest in Cambodia grew. Commercial penetration of the Chinese market, in 
competition with Britain, was a major French policy goal at the time and it was hoped 
that control of the unknown upper reaches of the Mekong might deliver it. Norodom’s 
increasingly desperate security situation played right into French hands. Along with the 
throne, the new young king had inherited a Cham and Muslim revolt and the enmity of 
two half-brothers, Sivotha and Sisowath. In 1862, still uncrowned, Norodom fled to 
Siam from whence, in 1863, the French manoeuvred his return and subsequent 
agreement to another protectorate treaty. In 1864, Norodom was finally enthroned, with 
the French unaware that Thai court envoys were acting as co-sponsors of the new 
king.20 This was the last hurrah for official Siamese influence at court, however. The 
French took seriously their treaty rights over Cambodian foreign affairs and ensured 
Siam’s former status as joint suzerain swiftly lapsed.  
Over the next twenty years at least, this demise of neighbourly interference in 
Cambodian affairs was arguably the single most visible effect of the 1863 treaty. As 
early colonial records show, in the first decades of Norodom’s lengthy reign (1860–
1904) the French protectorate over Cambodia was always far more nominal than real. 
This was particularly true in regard to the fiscal system. Two attempts at real change, 
first in 1877 and then again in 1884, proved largely futile. In the second case, the forced 
imposition of wide-ranging reforms, including the establishment of French residencies in 
the provinces and effective French control of the kingdom’s finances, helped trigger a 
massive anti-colonial uprising in 1885–86 that thwarted much effective fiscal change 
until 1892. As the next section will show, several factors combined to produce this 
unintended outcome, not least of them being Norodom’s intelligence and his ability to 
manipulate French weaknesses to defend his own interests. In this respect, Norodom’s 
greatest success was undoubtedly his establishing of a flourishing new revenue farming 
system, under the disapproving noses of senior protectorate officials. By the later 
1880s, this system was ruthlessly extracting millions of francs a year from the local 
economy and delivering them directly into the king’s hands, to use as he wished.  
The 1863 treaty had not given France the right to intervene in the internal 
government of Cambodia, despite protecting the kingdom from outside interference. As 
this unusual situation unfolded, it opened a real field of manoeuvre for the king, who 
learned how to manipulate French weaknesses in pursuit of his own interests. The 
highly unpopular royal revenue farming system was a direct result of this situation, and 
it could never have operated as it did without French protection. In the past, such a 
system would have triggered popular revolt, or pushed an ambitious prince to exploit 
popular resentment to try for the throne, with consequent Vietnamese or Thai 
incursions. But now, “the flag of France [covered] the abuses of royal authority with its 
all-powerful protection”,21 as a bombastic governor of Cochinchina had fumed 
impotently in 1882, and Norodom willingly took advantage of the opportunities thus 
granted him.  
The next section briefly considers the protectorate context that made the royal 
revenue farming system possible. 
                                                 
19Ibid., pp. 164-66, 183-84. 
20
 Milton Osborne, River Road to China. The Mekong River Expedition, 1866-73 (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1975), chapters 1 and 2. 
21
 Le Myre de Vilers’ draft report on Cambodia, 15 April 1882. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 10236 
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The Protectorate Context 
On 15 April 1882 a hot and disgruntled Governor Le Myre de Vilers of French 
Cochinchina drafted a report to the ministry in France about the three difficult weeks he 
had just spent in Cambodia negotiating with its king. The French protectorate over 
Cambodia was officially “confided in the Governor of Cochinchina”22 until an 1887 
administrative reorganisation of French possessions created the single colony of 
French Indochina comprising five different “countries” under locally-varying 
administrative systems. The governor normally exercised his powers through a French 
Representative in Phnom Penh; but, as the first civilian governor after two decades of 
naval rule, Le Myre de Vilers had wanted to deal with the irritating Cambodian situation 
in person. When the French had assured Norodom the throne in 1863, he stated, they 
had never imagined the sort of situation that now existed. But, he continued: 
 
little by little the King has grown used to the exercise of absolute power, and, it must be 
recognised, [power] without supervision; a stranger to the affairs of his own kingdom and 
to the interests of his subjects, his caprice has become the sole rule of conduct and, in 
many circumstances, he does not fear to act without us…  
 
Seven years before, taking advantage of unrest in 1875, the French had demanded 
reforms as the price of their military support. In particular, they had insisted on a fiscal 
reform (embodied in a royal ordinance of 15 January 1877) that forbade the creation of 
any new taxes without French approval and abolished all revenue farms except those 
on opium and alcohol.23 “Unfortunately”, the governor conceded in 1882, “all these 
measures had no sanction” and were now a “dead letter”.24  
As Le Myre de Vilers himself understood, protectorate weaknesses largely 
accounted for this failure. Although one of the French group keen to annex Cambodia to 
Cochinchina, the governor knew no successful takeover could occur at any time soon. 
Outside times of short-lived crisis, the French held too few political cards in Cambodia: 
their representative was poorly informed and his office poorly staffed; he lacked official 
access to the interior; and he had no real allies locally.25 Furthermore, the French 
representative in Phnom Penh had only limited armed strength at hand, in the first two 
decades especially. This hampered French effectiveness in crises, as occurred in 1870. 
In 1869, Norodom had sold the monopoly right on raw and cooked opium in all 
Cambodia to the Ban Hap Company, a Saigon-based Straits Chinese consortium that 
also operated the Cochinchina opium farm. In 1870, however, he had split raw and 
cooked opium into two revenue farms, and sold the raw opium rights to the Watseng 
Company, a Singaporean syndicate with French investors.26 Despite this, Norodom had 
secretly let Ban Hap import raw opium illegally for the first months of the newly 
contracted period. It provoked an escalating conflict between the two farms which 
alarmed the French representative in Phnom Penh. Although the French investors 
pressed for official support, Representative Pottier advised the governor against it. As 
he frankly avowed, local French authority could not be engaged in support of the 
French business interests for fear of losing face in any showdown. “All the Chinese of 
Phnom Penh are armed”, he explained, so “if we involve ourselves in such an affair we 
will obviously have to see it through to the end, and I do not have the means to do so”.27  
                                                 
22
 As the Paris ministry later reminded Le Myre de Viler’s replacement in its “Instructions for the Governor of 
Cochinchina” (November 1882). AOMI, Ancien fonds, A 11 (60), carton 3. 
23
 For two different views of this period, see Alain Forest, Le Cambodge et la colonisation française (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1980), pp. 9–16 and Chandler, History of Cambodia, pp. 140–47. 
24
 Both quotes from Le Myre de Vilers’ draft report, 15 April 1882. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 10236.  
25
 Ibid. 
26
 They included Andrew Spooner among them. 
27
 ProtRep to GovCC, letter of 11 April 1870. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 13279. I return to this farm later. 
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In addition to these limitations, two other factors undermined local French 
effectiveness: the representative’s subordinate political and administrative status vis-à-
vis the governor of Cochinchina; and his necessary reliance on persuasion in dealings 
with the king. 
The vesting of protectorate powers in the governor of Cochinchina was largely 
unavoidable before the 1887 organisation of the Indochinese Union under a governor-
general, but it always reduced the protectorate representative’s direct influence over 
Norodom. As the archives show, the local French official enjoyed no political initiative at 
all, and had to refer to Saigon for instructions about his line of conduct in virtually every 
matter. In all but the most serious situations, this arrangement gave Norodom valuable 
time and space in which to manoeuvre, so that the representative might find himself 
faced with a fait accompli, like a signed contract, before he could take any effective 
action to head it off. It also meant that the king could try to circumvent the local man by 
going directly to the real source of power in Saigon. If flattery or an appeal to wider 
diplomatic considerations failed, Norodom might use his revenue farm profits to gain his 
ends. On one notable occasion in late 1881, he appears to have sweetened Le Myre de 
Vilers by offering to subsidise the Cochinchina budgetary outlay on protectorate 
expenses in Cambodia by 66,000 piastres annually. It was a shrewd move, whose 
significance can only be understood in the context of the colony’s ongoing budgetary 
struggles. In 1860 Paris had forced Cochinchina to become self-financing but barred it 
from raising loans. Then in 1864 the metropole insisted Cochinchina begin repaying its 
subventions from the conquest era (1859-62). By the early 1880s 1.7 million 
desperately needed francs had returned to France.28 Understandably, Saigon keenly 
sought additional sources of income. At 1881 exchange rates, Norodom’s offer was 
worth 330,000 francs a year, or more than three times the average annual sum repaid 
to the metropole.29 This subvention may not have bought Norodom much real goodwill, 
but no doubt it made it easier for Saigon to overlook breaches to the 1877 convention 
for a while longer. 
Second, even when the representative had received his instructions from Saigon, 
and could make the king listen to him in an audience,30 persuasion remained his only 
weapon. Norodom generally dealt with French representatives in these years on a 
much more equal footing than any later kings enjoyed. He knew perfectly well that he 
could agree to any French request in a private audience while still pursuing 
contradictory personal interests in secret, if he wished. Where revenue was concerned, 
this was precisely how he acted. Jean Moura, for instance, was duped in this way in 
1875, after a French businessman had encouraged Norodom to set up, and sell to him, 
a monopoly on the raising and slaughtering of pigs in Phnom Penh. Moura tried to 
prevent it, disturbed at its impact on an estimated two thousand local families who 
raised pigs to supplement their income. Norodom had no doubt of Moura’s strong 
objections, but when the representative returned from a Saigon trip after he found the 
revenue farm was already secretly contracted for 200 silver bars (3,200 piastres).31 
When reproached about it, Norodom simulated agreement and annulled his contract 
with the French businessman. Two weeks later, however, Moura faced a fait accompli: 
two new monopolies suddenly appeared, with the pork abattoir now contracted to a 
Chinese. The arrangements had been made with such stealth that none but the king 
and the revenue farmers involved knew of their existence until days before the 
                                                 
28
 Étienne Denis, Bordeaux et la Cochinchine sous la restauration et le second empire (Impr. Delmas, 1965), 
pp. 175–81. 
29
 The exchange rate was 5 francs = 1 piastre. See the notes to Table One.  
30
 Norodom might simulate illness to postpone or cancel meetings on short notice. As he was an opium addict 
and often ill, the representative had no option but to accept such excuses and keep asking for an audience. 
More often the king would bluster, prevaricate, or simply deny all knowledge of the farm at issue. 
31
 ProtRep to GovCC, letter of 23 August, 1875. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 13334. See also dossier 13336. 
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monopolies began.32 Moura’s intervention may have stopped a new revenue farm on 
the raising of pigs, although pork consuming Chinese cronies at court might just as 
easily have dissuaded Norodom from an arrangement liable to discourage what was, 
for them, an essential sideline peasant industry. Otherwise, all Moura had achieved was 
to replace a French businessman with a Chinese one. 
Far more significant economically than these small later monopolies was 
Norodom’s quick farming out of “almost all” customs duties by the early 1870s,33 a 
practice that the 1877 convention would later vainly prohibit. In 1885, Fourès described 
how Norodom had successfully used the same evasive tactics deployed against Moura 
in 1875 to continue farming out his customs duties, in direct violation of the royal 
ordinance of 1877. Because of the farm’s illegality, no regular contracts were possible, 
so everything had rested on secret verbal agreements between Norodom personally 
and his Chinese farmers. As part of the plan, the king had approved special 
administrative arrangements, designed to deceive the French, by which the farmers and 
sub-farmers involved were appointed royal officials. “In each customs post there was a 
Cambodian agent whose job consisted of calling himself the head of customs, in case 
the Protectorate Representative wanted to be informed whether the ordinance of 1877 
was being truly and faithfully carried out”, Fourès reported. “The [Chinese sub-] farmers 
thus had no rights, and they knew it well enough to call themselves the scribes of the 
Cambodian.”34 All three French representatives in Phnom Penh from the mid-1870s to 
the mid-1880s (Moura, Aymonier, and Fourès) reported similar revenue-related 
subterfuges on Norodom’s part, yet they could neither persuade nor force the king to 
accept Saigon’s policy line and desist from farming almost all his revenue sources.   
By 1884, his patience exhausted and with a gunboat anchored opposite the palace, 
Governor Thomson forced Norodom to sign the Convention of 17 July which, among 
other reforms, established French residents in the interior to supervise Cambodian 
governors, vested all revenue matters in French hands, and institutionalised private 
property rights in land. As David Chandler has explained, these reforms attacked the 
interests of the Cambodian elite by tearing apart the fabric of patron-client bonds that 
wove together traditional Cambodian society.35 With Norodom basically a prisoner, 
seven months after the French tried to implement their new powers Cambodia exploded 
into a rebellion that would last for eighteen months. Unable to quell the revolt in its first 
year, despite the assistance of Norodom’s ambitious half-brother Sisowath, the French 
finally turned to the king. Chandler has argued that the threat posed by the Convention 
of 1884 to long-established social relations and practices accounted for the longevity 
and ferocity of the revolt. The French at the time took a different view, believing it 
reflected a deep Khmer attachment to “the monarchical form” of government.36 Luck 
favoured Norodom; the French finally solicited his assistance not long before the revolt 
would probably have waned of its own account. Norodom’s price, however, was the 
effective watering-down of many of the 1884 reforms, in particular the return of the 
fiscal system to royal control. This duly occurred on 1 January 1887.37 
Ironically, given that compulsion had so signally failed in 1877 and 1884 to transfer 
control of revenue to the protectorate, it would be persuasion that ultimately succeeded, 
but only after the politico-administrative context had changed fundamentally with the 
                                                 
32
 ProtRep to GovCC, letter of 8 Sept 1875. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 13337. The other involved fish and is 
discussed below. 
33
 ProtRep to GovCC, letter of 5 March 1871. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 10033. 
34
 ProtRep to GovCC, letter of 7 July 1885. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 10007. Étienne Aymonier had reported the 
same practice in a letter of 31 May 1880 regarding the fishing net farm. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 12603. 
35
 Chandler, History of Cambodia, pp. 142–47. 
36
 In 1882 Le Myre de Vilers had warned against trespassing too far on Norodom’s royal prerogatives for fear 
that, if he fled to the interior, “all his people would be with him, for Cambodia is deeply attached to the 
monarchical form”. Draft report to MinCols, 15 April 1882. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 10236. 
37
 De Vernéville provided the date in his report of 1st trimester, 1890. AOMI, Ancien fonds A 20 [32], c. 6. 
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creation of the Union of French Indochina. Henceforth, the new resident superior of 
Cambodia became the local representative of the new governor-general of Indochina, 
not of the lieutenant-governor of Cochinchina. For the first time, an opportunity thus 
existed for Cambodian interests not to be automatically subordinated to those of 
Cochinchina, as had so often previously happened.38 One typical example occurred 
after Norodom sold the Cambodian opium farm monopoly for three years (1884–86) to 
the Cochinchina Indirect Customs Service (the Régie) for the (no doubt deliberately) 
low rate of 66,000 piastres per year.39 Saigon’s optimistic budgetary forecast projected 
the new farm would generate 67,064 piastres in its first year, after start-up costs and 
other expenses. (This year was normally the most expensive and losses were 
common.40) As the governor enthused to the minister in Paris, the receipts would 
hopefully increase over time, so “the new Régie will become an important source of 
funds for the colony of Cochinchina”.41 Instead, the farm made a loss, thanks to the 
1885–86 rebellion and to uncontrolled smuggling; but the protectorate budget in 
Cambodia was a much bigger loser. During a countrywide insurrection, when French 
troops lacked sanitary barracks and decent hospitals, the protectorate had been 
required to give top priority to building bonded warehouses for the French officials of the 
Régie. In mid-1887, when Resident General Piquet pleaded with the Cochinchina 
governor to return to the former revenue farming system, he estimated it would save his 
budget 50,000 to 100,000 piastres annually.42 
If the 1887 constitutional arrangements removed the threat of Cambodia annexation 
to Cochinchina, they equally created an incentive for its French administrators to defend 
protectorate interests—its budgetary resources especially—against the incroachments 
of their powerful neighbour.43 The first resident superior, Huyn de Vernéville, showed 
what might be achieved in the new conditions. His vocal defence of protectorate 
interests in opposition to Cochinchina, which infuriated Le Myre de Vilers, now deputé 
for Cochinchina in Paris, had pleased Norodom. Apparently mistaking de Vernéville’s 
actions for a defence of Cambodian interests, the king struck up a cordial relationship 
with him. But what neither king nor deputé realised was that, cleverly and patiently, de 
Vernéville was, in Alain Forest’s words, “weaving the web within the kingdom that would 
paralyse Norodom’s resistance” towards real fiscal reform.44 When success came in 
1891 it was as swift as it was total, surprising even the resident superior. In one blow, 
de Vernéville achieved a French policy goal that had eluded everyone else since it first 
appeared in the Convention of 1884—the exchange of Norodom’s rights in the fiscal 
system for a civil list payment of 360,000 piastres—and that despite the strenuous 
objections of the kings’ own mother.45 Revenue farming still persisted in Cambodia for 
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another fifteen years but, with one short-lived exception,46 from then on it was a French-
controlled system. 
Let us now consider what Norodom had actually surrendered in 1891, the royal 
revenue farming system of the 1870s and 1880s.  
 
Norodom’s Revenue Farming System, 1870-1891 
When Andrew Spooner visited Cambodia in late 1862, he reported there were two 
revenue farms, on opium and gambling, which were sold to Chinese farmers for about 
150,000 piastres. He also reported outlets for the revenue farms’ products were 
“established in all villages of any importance”, suggesting that neither farms were new 
creations.47 As Spooner travelled exclusively by water, most of the villages boasting 
opium dens and gambling houses would also have contained Chinese or Sino–Khmer 
inhabitants, along the Mekong in particular. This implicit connection with established 
Chinese residents equally suggests that some sort of revenue farming had existed 
under Ang Duang, and that it was principally, if not entirely, designed to tax the lifestyle 
preferences of Chinese residents.  
Ang Duang might have learned about revenue farming operations during his life in 
Chakkri Siam; but it is also possible that some basic form of revenue farming had 
existed in Cambodia itself from as early as the later seventeenth century.48 The Krâm 
Srok law code of 1693 had included a tax on gambling, one of the main pastimes of the 
Chinese (and Vietnamese) community, and stipulated that it had to be collected by a 
Chinese. As Chinese residents undoubtedly organised most gambling, perhaps it was 
thought that only a Chinese could successfully tax it; but equally, the official involved 
might have purchased his appointment as royal gambling tax collector, thus in essence 
operating as a revenue farmer.49 We do not know. What is clear from the later-1830s 
Vietnamese report, “The Customs of Trấn Tây”, is that specific items of consumption or 
popular pastimes among the Chinese and Vietnamese communities attracted special 
taxes in the early nineteenth century, and very probably well before. “Taxes are levied 
here on everything—markets, slaughterhouses, wine, prostitution, and gambling, all 
have to pay tax”, the author noted, before piously adding the Vietnamese had abolished 
all but the taxes on opium, gambling, and prostitution.50 Given the ramshackle nature of 
the administrative system that Chandler described in Cambodia at the time,51 it seems 
most likely that these revenues were collected on the king’s behalf by men with good 
contacts in the communities directly affected by the taxes, and that they might have 
paid a negotiable fee, or taken a share in the receipts, for doing so. If so, such an 
arrangement would have been a far cry from the systematic exploitation of Norodom’s 
later nineteenth-century revenue farming system. Before moving to that, however, let 
me briefly sketch the main elements of the earlier fiscal system,52 as a baseline for the 
changes of the Norodom era.  
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First, and most important, the king was immanent possessor of the entire kingdom, 
even if by custom and usage its surplus was widely disseminated, either as apanages 
or products, across a comparatively large number of people—royal family members, 
officials of various sorts, the large royal court, religious specialists, and so on. Even 
uninhabited woodlands were granted to “masters of the forest”, who arranged to exploit 
areas in exchange for an annual tribute to the king. Only fisheries were free to the 
populace, although local officials traditionally levied small variable fees on nets and fish-
traps. Beyond this loose, crosscutting network of customary rights, however, all state 
revenue belonged to the monarch personally, as did the land. Where his Khmer 
subjects were concerned, the king taxed in kind: he took one-tenth of their January 
harvest, as assessed on the spot by royal delegates; he received a slice of judicial fines 
before they were divided between the judges and the winning parties in court cases; his 
customs’ posts removed his share of all the goods that passed before them, whether 
circulating internally or for export; and all free men, slaves, and serfs owed him ninety 
days’ labour. 
By at least the eighteenth century, with the resident Chinese community swollen by 
the exodus of anti-Qing elements from southern China, new sorts of taxes or rents 
appeared. Collected in money or bullion, some were aimed at particular items of 
Chinese consumption, like a fee for the slaughtering of pigs,53 or at Chinese pastimes 
like gambling. At some stage, kings also exercised their immanent right over the soil to 
monopolise highly fertile lands on riverbanks and islands, which they rented out 
annually to the highest bidder for cash payments. Most renters would have been 
Chinese or Sino-Khmer, since they were the ones most likely to own, or have access to, 
the silver required for payment in advance. In the early nineteenth century, when 
Vietnam controlled all Cambodia’s maritime outlets, “The Customs of Trấn Tây” 
reported the king was still netting thousands of silver bars each year from market 
cultivators keen to secure these fertile fields,54 even though the resulting commodities 
(vegetables, cotton, tobacco, betel nut, and sugar cane) were likely to attract both 
Cambodian and Vietnamese customs, each officially set at 10 percent, on their way to 
market. Such trade was quite profitable: when Spooner enquired in 1862 he found an 
average after-tax profit of 80 percent in Saigon for commodities bought in Phnom Penh 
and shipped downriver.55  
Before Norodom, then, Khmer subjects and foreign residents had basically 
operated within two different fiscal systems, one monetised, the other not, although 
each ultimately derived from the king’s immanent rights as sole owner of the entire 
kingdom. Norodom’s revenue farming system assumed this same fundamental 
principle, but in practice its operations transcended anything that had existed before.  
The royal revenue farming system evolved in two main stages: the first ran from the 
1860s until the promulgation of the Convention of 1877; then the second, the hey-day of 
royal revenue farming operations, from 1878 until 1891.The first stage was 
characterised by the sort of revenue farms, like on opium, alcohol, and customs’ duties, 
that the king would have known during his years at the Chakkri court.56 In the second 
stage, however, the evidence shows Norodom innovating, creating new revenue 
sources and revenue farms by transforming customary rights to his own benefit, 
including ones not formerly vested in the throne.  
Nothing I have seen in the archives suggests that French officials ever fully grasped 
what was happening in 1880s Cambodia. Men from Cochinchina happily damned the 
king as a debauched Asiatic potentate, avid for gain to squander on his luxuries, 
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fripperies, and vices.57 Even Resident General de Champeaux, who in 1888 gamely 
tried to explain Norodom’s quest for profits as an attempt “to assure the future of his 
wives and numerous children”, still ultimately attributed his actions to moral failings, to 
“venality” and “greed”.58 Only de Vernéville in 1890 came close to understanding what 
had actually occurred, when he described Norodom’s attitude towards revenue farming 
as, in effect, that of a rational economic actor relentlessly pursuing his own interests in 
changing circumstances:59 
 
Realising that the system of farms and monopolies allows him to receive—in advance and 
without apparent difficulty, irrespective of the condition of the country or the harvest 
yield—taxes which had previously given him some trouble [to collect], seeing competition 
established and the amount offered for the revenue farms increasing year by year, the 
monarch has reached the point today of farming everything, from the capitation tax on the 
Chinese, Indians, and Vietnamese to the land tax under the various forms that it assumes 
in this country. 
 
Like de Vernéville, it seems to me that rational choices underpinned the 
development of the royal revenue farming system, but choices that went beyond the 
king’s recognising a fiscal gold mine when he saw one. At some early stage, Norodom 
seems to have begun to make one of the fiscal transitions that had distinguished 
absolutist European kings from their early modern predecessors. Using practices that, 
in the hands of a contemporaneous colonial state would be described by historians as 
“rational” or “modernising”, the king began reorganising the plethora of loose or 
negotiable traditional rights, duties, fees, taxes, etc, that the throne had customarily 
shared with others at all levels of the fiscal system. In the process he employed new 
revenue raising mechanisms that were characterised by centralisation of control and 
very much more effective revenue collection, vested in the hands of people for whom it 
represented a business investment.  
The 1860s farming of royal customs duties was the first such transaction, but 
unfortunately it largely occurred before extant records begin. In 1871 Moura reported 
most royal customs duties were already being farmed, although, he added, without any 
Cambodian government supervision, the farmers were acting “without moderation” and 
provoking complaints from Vietnamese traders that had the potential to disturb the 
peace.60 While individual cases of corruption or abuse of authority no doubt occurred, 
the existence of such complaints need not necessarily have reflected systematic or 
even widespread corruption at the time. The royal orders that governed revenue 
farmers’ activities only authorised them to collect the traditional 10 percent per value 
royal customs duty, plus one percent for overheads.61 Yet this action alone would have 
been enough to overturn normal mid-century practices and generate disputes, 
according to Spooner’s 1862 observations. After travelling extensively on the Mekong 
and Tonle Sap Rivers, Spooner described the 10 percent customs levy as lax and 
negotiable: royal customs posts “never [made] any precise audits [of cargoes] and the 
tax [was] always paid to the great advantage of the exporter”.62 Unlike the unpaid royal 
customs officials whom they replaced, the new revenue sub-farmers were either the 
employees of the monopolists or had paid in advance to share in his privileges. They  
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thus had a personal interest in collecting all that was due, if not more, and were most 
unlikely to strike deals favouring anyone but themselves. As a result, a newly-strict 
implementation of age-old royal rights fallen into decay during the calamities of earlier 
times would have felt like an abusive new impost to people used to a much more 
flexible system, especially to southern Vietnamese who believed themselves specially 
protected in Cambodia by their status as French subjects.  
In the early 1870s, revenue farming fees accounted for about one-third of royal 
revenue, with the lion’s share generated by the countrywide network of opium and 
gambling outlets that alone accounted for 25 percent of Norodom’s revenue (see Table 
One below).63 In the mid-1870s, the pace of revenue farming apparently accelerated, as 
individual businessmen tempted the king to create new monopolies. In 1874, as 
rumours swirled of new farms on bananas and silk, Aymonier recounted how a royal 
page from (Siamese) Angkor had tried to bribe him into approving a lucrative new 
revenue farm on foreign boats entering Cambodia, something that would directly violate 
the free trade treaty with French Cochinchina. By the mid-1870s, it seemed to Aymonier 
that “the king [would] set up farms to the extent that he could find revenue farmers”.64 In 
1875 Moura reported another Siamese approach. Having heard that one of the king’s 
Siamese women enjoyed great influence over him, “some Siamese, or Chinese” from 
Bangkok tried to use her to convince Norodom to introduce a “complete system of 
monopolies that would have extended right up to objects of consumption and prime 
necessity”, just like the one in Siam at the time.65 In this respect, Moura singled out a 
proposed revenue farm on fish which he believed “very much more prejudicial to small 
merchants and the population” than the other one, suggested by a French 
businessman, on the raising and slaughtering of pigs.66 Yet despite his strong 
opposition, and Norodom’s spurious agreement with him, Moura could not stop the two 
farms from being created and sold.67  
Finally, an 1877 attack by Norodom’s rebellious half-brother, Sivotha, enabled the 
French to exploit the king’s security concerns and force him to promulgate new laws 
that abolished all but the alcohol and opium farms, and required Protectorate approval 
for any new taxes. This first serious French attempt to stem the rising tide of revenue 
farming was washed away about eighteen months later, however. The test case came 
in late 1878, when Norodom openly sold the right to collect the rent on the 225 state-
owned houses in Phnom Penh—at the time the main source of lodgings in the capital—
for 1,900 piastres a month.68 The new monopolist, a newly-arrived French businessman 
called Octave Vandelet, promptly exercised his rights and raised the rent on 205 of the 
houses by two piastres a month. Moura invoked the 1877 Convention, and angry 
Chinese tenants demonstrated vocally outside the protectorate concession, but to no 
avail.69 Some months later the incoming protectorate representative, Aymonier, wrote to 
Saigon to support Moura’s firm stance, urging that if they let Norodom act “by circuitous 
means” to annul the 1877 reforms then “what he does today in regard to houses he 
might do tomorrow for renters of agricultural land, where the system is similar; then the 
day after it will be the turn of the customs receipts”.70 Aymonier might also have added  
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Table One. Norodom’s Official Revenue from Tax Farms, 1873-91¹ 
Year Type of farm Amount     (in s) 
18732 Raw opium in balls 
Cooked opium and gambling (not lotteries) 
Rice wine and sugar (Phnom Penh) 
Rice wine, Kampot 
Rice wine, other provinces 
Phnom Penh lotteries 
Provincial lotteries 
                          Sub-total 
Plus revenue from customs posts, 
 total 
310,000fr (approx.  51,660 p)* 
413,600fr (approx.  68,930 p) 
   90,000fr (approx. 15,000 p) 
   20,000fr (approx.   3,330 p) 
   25,000fr (approx.   4,160 p) 
   76,900fr (approx.  12,815 p) 
   27,000fr (approx.    4,550 p) 
                  (approx. 160,445p) 
1,612,000fr (or 16,120 silver bars 
                     or 268,666 p) 
1874 No information  
1875 Slaughtering of pigs, Phnom Penh  200 silver bars ( or 3,200 p)§ 
1876 No information  
1877 Rental of State-owned houses, Phnom Penh                                   19,200 p 
1879 Rental of State-owned houses, Phnom Penh                                   22,800 p 
1880 Fisheries leases and tax on equipment   2,800 bars (about   32,000 p) 
1881 Opium and alcohol farm, all Cambodia  
Gambling and pig slaughtering 
Fisheries 
Pawnshops, Phnom Penh  
Rental of State-owned houses 
Capitation tax on Chinese & Vietnamese 
Rental of lands on Mekong banks 
Rental of islands 
                          sub-total  
Plus revenue from customs, total 
11,000 bars (about 165,000 p)ª 
  3,400 bars (about   51,000 p) 
  3,000 bars (about   45,000 p) 
       70 bars (about      1,050 p) 
  1,950 bars (about    29,250 p) 
  3,600 bars (about    54,000 p 
   1,800 bars (about   27,000 p) 
   2,400 bars (about   36,000 p) 
 27,220 bars (about 408,300 p) 
 42,220 bars (or 633,300 p or  
                     3,166,500 francs)    
1882 Salted fish customs duties 
Sale of fish in Phnom Penh market  
Rights to all State fisheries  
   2,400 bars (about  36,000 p) 
                                    1,300 p 
   3,300 bars (  about 49,500 p) 
1883 Salted fish customs duties    3,400 bars (or        51,000 p) 
1884 Cochinchina regie as opium farmer4 
Fisheries, ponds and rivers 
thirty-six animals’ lottery3 
Gambling and Phnom Penh pork abattoirs 
 11,000 bars (fixed at 66,000p)° 
   3,200 bars (or          48,000 p) 
   3,050 bars (fixed at 45,750 p)♠ 
   3,750 bars (fixed at 58,125 p) ♠ 
1885 Cochinchina regie as opium farmer 
State fisheries in various locations  
gambling and Phnom Penh pork abattoirs 
 11,000 bars (fixed at 66,000p)° 
   4,000 bars (or          62,000 p)  
   3,750 bars (fixed at 58,125 p) ♠ 
1886 Cochinchina regie as opium farmer 
Gambling and Phnom Penh pork abattoirs 
 11,000 bars (fixed at 66,000p)° 
   3,750 bars (fixed at 58,125 p) ♠ 
1887 Rice wine and alcohol 
Combined gambling, pigs, and Phnom Penh  
pawnshops 
                                   (92,000 p) 
5100 bars & 170 taels of gold; or 
                                    (82,150 p) 
1888 Rice wine and alcohol 
Gambling, pigs, and pawnshops 
                                   (92,000 p) 
                                   (82,150 p) 
1889 Tax on first rice 
Rice wine and alcohol 
Gambling, pigs, and pawnshops 
    650 silver bars ( or    9,750 p)± 
                                  ( 92,000 p) 
                                   (82,150 p) 
1890 Opium  
Rice wine and alcohol 
All gambling and pork abattoirs 
Phnom Penh pawnshops 
Paddy and sugar taxes 
                                 (216,000 p) 
                                 (143,000 p) 
                                  (  87,200 p) 
                                   (  1,794 p) 
  3000 bars    (or          46,500 p) 
1891 All state fisheries 
All gambling and pork abattoirs 
Phnom Penh pawnshops  
Capitation taxes on foreign Asians 
Main rice tax 
                                  ( 90,000 p) 
                                  ( 87,200 p) 
                                   (  1,794 p) 
                                   (60,000 p) 
                                    (25,000 p) 
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Notes 
¹ The table excludes the Second King’s five provinces and the Queen Mother’s apanage and only contains 
farms whose rents have direct archival referents. However, apart from the thirty-six animals’ lottery, any item 
listed between 1880 and 1891 undoubtedly existed for the whole period, and possibly longer.  
2 The 1873 list excludes rents from agricultural land, State-owned houses, and fisheries because archival 
documents do not stipulate whether these revenue sources were farmed at the time.  
3 The contract was immediately annulled by the Cochinchina Governor on 1 Jan 1884. The farm reappeared 
in 1887 but was banned again by 1889. 
4 The Cochinchina Indirect Contributions Service held the Cambodian opium farm for these three years.  
 
Exchange rates used 
* 1873, an estimated rate of 1 piastre = 6 francs and 1 silver bar = 100 francs  
§ 1875, 1 silver bar = 16 piastres, or about 100 francs 
ª 1881, 1 silver bar = 75 francs; 1 silver bar = 15 piastres  
° according to dossier 11670, in this contract 11,000 bars only yielded 66,000 piastres (giving a low rate of 1 
bar = 11 piastres) 
♠ 1884, the exchange rate for this contract was agreed at 1 bar = 15.5 piastres 
± 1 silver bar = 15 piastres, 1889 
 
 
 
that letting such a dangerous precedent stand must seriously undermine the French 
representative’s ability to restrain royal revenue raising activities. His superior in 
Cochinchina, however, had no effective advice on how to proceed with the king.71 
This dispute initiated the second phase of the royal revenue farming system. 
Norodom now moved systematically, though often still secretly in the early years,72 
towards farming out every impost, tax, fee, or source of revenue available to him, apart 
from the head tax on his Khmer subjects. Despite occasionally losing control of certain 
farms, or having a lottery banned by the French, the king was basically able to farm 
whatever taxes he wished at this time. The result was, as Resident Superior de 
Vernéville acknowledged in 1890, that “all taxes, whether direct or indirect, are farmed”, 
with the sole exception noted above. Indeed, his immediate predecessor, Resident 
General de Champeaux, either out of sympathy for what he imagined to be Norodom’s 
financial plight or thanks to royal bribery,73 had actually ensured this result by returning 
to the king a minor tax on early rice that Norodom had sold to the protectorate in 1887 
for 400 silver bars (and which he instantly rented out again for 650 bars in 1889).74  
More significantly, Norodom also began experimenting with the creation of new, 
farmable revenue sources. The earliest example was probably the two-pronged 
changes to the fisheries tax system that occurred between 1878 and 1879. At some 
point, the king asserted real rather than immanent royal ownership over all ponds and 
rivers (excluding the Tonle Sap Great Lake, which was governed by a convention with 
Siam), and began to lease tracts of them annually to farmers and sub-farmers. In the 
latter case, numbers of them were increasingly ethnic Vietnamese. Although the throne 
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had long leased out certain specific fisheries, as did other apanage holders,75 such a 
generalised claim to all village waterways was “a very recent” addition to the fiscal 
system.76 It was also a very unpopular one, as Aymonier noted when reporting in 1880 
how the area under lease was increasingly encroaching on local waterways. In 1881 
armed clashes erupted, with Khmers in certain places forcibly stopping Vietnamese 
sub-farmers from monopolising areas that had always been village entitlements. 
Significantly, local Cambodian officials often looked the other way at this time.77 Many 
of them were also smarting from the second move in Norodom’s reorganisation of 
fishing revenues. In 1879, the king had stripped their ancient right to tax fishing 
equipment and sold it to revenue farmers. Then, in 1880, “encouraged by French 
silence”, Norodom devised a brand new revenue farm by combining the old tax on 
fishing nets—now extended to all equipment78—with the new monopoly on fisheries 
leases. He received “more than 2000 bars” for its first sale. Minor local officials, 
deprived of their ancient rights, continued to exercise them anyway and took 
“compensation from the waterways reserved for the people”,79 sending waves of 
disaffection rippling deeply into Khmer society.  
A second farm that appeared in the early 1880s was also “a personal invention of 
Norodom”.80 He created it by stripping provincial officials of their ancient share in local 
fines and inheritances and vesting them in the throne, after which he promptly 
reorganised them into a saleable monopoly. Previously, leading officials in every 
province had maintained underlings who collected certain fees or benefits on their 
behalf (and that of the king) from a variety of sources, like malefactors (prisoners going 
to goal, convicted people paying fines, or monks who had committed crimes), farmers 
whose buffaloes were confiscated for wandering into the wrong fields, people inheriting 
legacies, etc. These arrangements had long been an accepted part of life; but in 
reporting the change Fourès now feared revenue farmers’ agents would encourage 
disputes, or at the very least push them increasingly into the judicial system, for their 
own profit.81 Something like this does seem to have happened, in part no doubt 
because Norodom awarded this new farm to one of his favourites who probably felt 
emboldened by royal protection to exploit it thoroughly. Certainly, when de Vernéville 
reported the end of this particular farm in January 1892, he noted that its abolition had 
caused “real enthusiasm among the population”.82  
If both these new farms centralised in royal hands customary rights previously more 
widely distributed in society, another transformation of traditional usages also seems to 
have occurred in the 1880s. It concerned the nature of customary gift giving, at least 
where revenue farm contracts were concerned. In the 1870s, for instance, Chinese 
opium farmers had favoured princes and high mandarins with special arrangements,83 
while Norodom himself received six large balls of opium each month for his own use.84 
When a French business won the opium farm contract in 1881, Vandelet, one of its 
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principals, objected to the practice as an uncontrollable source of smuggling and 
offended Norodom by offering to pay the equivalent amount in silver.85 Vandelet’s 
pragmatism was unusual among Europeans of the time who usually saw such 
exchanges as bribes or exactions, ignoring the fact that in early modern bureaucracies, 
especially ones like Cambodia where officials rarely received regular salaries, such gifts 
were valued perquisites of office and markers of status and respect.  
While information is scanty, it appears likely that, by the 1880s, the ever-rising 
value of the revenue farms at auction led Norodom to demand increasingly valuable 
“customary gifts” to guarantee the granting of a monopoly contract. Other members of 
the court also benefited: in 1883, when Foc Yao, a Chinese public works entrepreneur 
in Phnom Penh bought the rights to the Chinese lottery of thirty-six animals the king 
received 1000 silver bars in advance as bond money, while “ministers, the king’s wives, 
etc” were also given 375 bars (worth over 5500 piastres) as “customary gifts” to smooth 
the process.86 Perhaps such amounts might still pass muster as “customary gifts”, albeit 
at the top of the scale; but, if the experience of the Cantonese Lưu Chap was at all 
typical, by then late 1880s the process had escalated into regularised extortion.  
Lưu Chap had held the combined monopoly of gambling (baquan), pig butchering, 
and the Phnom Penh pawnshop for several years in the early and later 1880s. In 1890 
this farm officially yielded Norodom 89,000 piastres annually. However, the complete 
(and secret) contract between Chap and the king revealed a very different picture, one 
in which “customary gifts” had been transformed into stipulated extra payments. They 
included a specified amount on the king’s birthday, itemised articles of stationary 
(varying sorts of paper and ink), a transaction fee of one Vietnamese quan for every 45 
piastres paid by the farm into the treasury, and an annual “gift” of 470 taels of gold to be 
handed directly to the king.87 The gold alone was worth 15,650 piastres. According to 
Chap, these secret payments made the annual cost of operating the farm over 47,000 
piastres higher than it had been in 1884–87.88 
By the late 1880s, then, Norodom had single-mindedly pursued every avenue of 
revenue-raising available to him, in a process that had subsumed certain ancient 
customary rights and privileges and centralised them in the king’s hands. Yet none of 
the comparatively huge amounts regularly generated went to reform the state adminis-
tration. Although he had reluctantly agreed to pay salaries to governors and judges in 
the 1870s, Norodom could only rarely be pressured into doing so;89 while crucial posts 
like provincial governorships were regularly sold to the highest bidder, sometimes only 
months after they had been awarded to another.90 So if the king did not use his wealth 
to reform the state, what did he do with it? The short answer seems to be that he 
expended it as any traditional Cambodian king would have wished, to ensure he lived in 
a style befitting his rank, something denied to all his predecessors for over a century. A 
disgusted Le Myre de Vilers unwittingly confirmed this in 1882 when he wrote that: 
 
the expenses of the court are growing each year; through vanity, the King allows himself 
to get caught up in combining all the refinements of European comfort with Asiatic luxury: 
Tagal music and Cambodian music; carriages of all sorts and 250 elephants led 
and guarded by numerous slaves; a flotilla of steam launches and innumerable 
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boats of all types, from the grand luxury boat to the canoe with 40 rowers to the 
ghe lương; Tagal police and Cambodian police, infantry, cavalry, artillery, body 
guards, pages, etc in the European style; French food and wine, whose cost is 
added to the upkeep of his personnel: European, Chinese, Annamite, Tagal, 
Cambodian, Penong, etc servants; the immoderate acquisition of diamonds and 
jewels; and finally, to crown it all, a harem composed of 400 women, whose 
number increases each year by the corruption of minors carried out in Siam 
through the intermediary of [the king’s servant] the Indian Ibrahim, English subject. 
 
If, as de Champeaux noted in 1888, Norodom had a “very high opinion of the 
nobility of his race” and felt “a very great pride in his origins”,91 an even deeper 
motivation for this behaviour might have lain buried in the ambivalent legacy of an 
impoverished childhood and later young adulthood in Chakkri Siam. While Norodom 
remained deeply attached to Siamese people and culture, the Chakkri court took a 
different view of Cambodians, happily describing them to the French in 1864 as a “half 
barbarous” people who were “very much less civilised” than the Siamese.92 Perhaps 
some of Norodom’s extravagance, in particular the 1892 construction of his own 
Emerald Buddha Pagoda, each of whose 5000 silver floor tiles weighed one kilo, might 
ultimately have been directed at Bangkok, as proof that the Cambodian monarch was at 
long last as splendid as his erstwhile Thai overlord. 
 But whatever the king’s motivations, the royal revenue farming system was an 
increasing burden on the local society by the late 1880s. As drought struck the 
countryside in 1890, sub-farmers collecting the royal rice tax found it harder to extract 
surplus rice,93 in part because the combination of falling prices, rising export on-costs, 
and growing tax demands over the previous two years had started to drive some Khmer 
rice growers into subsistence production.94 At the rice tax collection of 1891, popular 
exasperation erupted into violence against sub-farmers who had been “harassing the 
people by exaggerating the amounts of rice, refusing to measure them, and taxing them 
arbitrarily”. Two were killed and others wounded or driven off.95 A few months later, 
Norodom offered his revenue farming rights to the new united protectorate and royal 
treasury that Resident Superior de Vernéville had persuaded him to approve from 1892.  
We will never know what finally caused Norodom to relinquish control of the fiscal 
system. Perhaps the threat of popular uprisings, with Sivotha still lurking along the 
border, weighed on his mind, along with the wearying realisation that a single local 
budget would bring unrelenting French pressure for economies and accountability. But 
as an intelligent economic actor Norodom might have ultimately been convinced by de 
Vernéville’s most telling argument: when the Frenchman politely made it clear that he 
would not allow Norodom to continue ignoring the revenue farmers’ excesses, he also 
remarked that such controls would naturally encourage lower bids at future auctions, 
and diminished royal revenues.96 In these circumstances, the offer of a civil list payment 
20 percent higher than that made in 1884 might have been too attractive to pass up.  
Whatever might have decided Norodom, however, one thing is clear—the 
pernicious extent of the premium levied on the fiscal system by revenue farmers in the 
late 1880s. The only available figures in this respect are for the main rice tax farm. In 
1890 Norodom had secretly agreed, a year in advance, to sell this monopoly for 1891–
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93 for 45,000 piastres. This sum afforded him a tidy 20,000 piastres profit on the 
existing revenue farmer’s annual payment of 25,000 piastres.97 Before the contract 
could start, however, the protectorate took over the fiscal system and it was annulled. In 
1892, when this same tax was collected by salaried officials for the first time, and at a 
much reduced rate (down from 1/10th to 1/15th), the receipts totalled 120,000 piastres. 
In other words, despite drought and popular resistance, in 1891 the Chinese revenue 
farmers had extracted a minimum of four to five times the official repayments on the rice 
revenue farm, apart from whatever else the main farmers might have initially realised 
from selling shares to their sub-farmers. If Norodom was making a fortune from the 
royal revenue farming system, so too were some of his Chinese revenue farmers. 
So let us turn now to this last component of the royal revenue farming system, the 
Chinese revenue farmers and their farms. 
 
 
Chinese Revenue Farms and Farmers, c.1870–91 
Unlike Vietnamese, Chinese people had always been welcome in Cambodia, as the 
author of the “Customs of Trấn Tây” had frankly recorded. They freely intermarried with 
Khmer women and many learned the language, including Chinese merchants who lived 
downriver in the six provinces of southern Vietnam.98 Chinese men from Vietnamese 
provinces had even joined forces with Chinese living in Cambodia in the great 
insurrection that had helped drive the Vietnamese from “Trấn Tây”. But forty years later, 
in January 1886, the leading Chinese of Phnom Penh were compelled to petition the 
protectorate to lower Chinese capitation taxes that year because their compatriots in 
the interior had been “the victims of several massacres by the rebels”, who had forced 
them to “stop their commerce, with their houses being pillaged and burned”. Many 
reportedly languished in Phnom Penh without work.99 Their situation was bad enough 
for the protectorate to grant a 30 percent tax reduction in response.100 This inter-ethnic 
violence would not have surprised Jean Moura. In 1883, he had roundly condemned 
certain Chinese for exploiting the country in the “most ferocious and systematic” way, 
through the control of customs and other revenue farms which they administered “to the 
detriment of the poor people who, pushed to the extreme, more than once have laid 
hands on these public establishments after Chinese had taken them as revenue farms 
and made bandit dens out of them”.101 If Chinese had become the collectively targets of 
Khmer anger by the mid-1880s, it was because, by then, they had also become the ugly 
public face of Norodom’s revenue farming system.  
 In large part this outcome was unavoidable. Just as in the rest of Southeast Asia, 
Chinese participation was essential to revenue farming operations at every level. It was 
not simply that large Chinese businessmen provided much of the capital to bid for the 
initial monopoly right to collect revenue on the state’s behalf; other Chinese filled many 
of the indispensable roles further down the line without which the system would have 
faltered, if not failed. The original rights were usually only contracted en bloc to one or 
two individuals, or a small consortium, who then almost always divided them to sell as 
shares to sub-farmers. These men might then either organise the actual activities at a 
local level via their own agents, or further sub-divide their shares to sell to their own 
sub-farmers who would employ their own people to operate the exploitation at the local 
level. It was these men, again mostly Chinese, who ran or policed the distilleries, opium 
dens, or gaming houses, collected the customs duties, sold the lottery tickets, assessed 
the harvest dues or fishing taxes, harassed fellow Chinese for capitation taxes, and so 
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forth. They were the ones whose activities spawned the innumerable complaints 
against unjust or unfair treatment that accompanied the expansion of the revenue 
farming system. By the 1880s, the court contacts of larger revenue farmers often 
ensured their agents on the ground could act with a good deal of immunity. In 1882, for 
instance, when a secret farm on the customs duties for dried fish was awarded to 
Ibrahim, one of Norodom’s palace servants and personal cronies, and to his Chinese 
partner, Ly Tek, Tek was appointed a customs supervisor to legitimate the arrange-
ment. Almost immediately their agents, in this case both Chinese and Khmer, had 
began to dispute fishing catches at customs’ posts near the Great Lake, winning the 
argument by the simple expedient of refusing to allow anyone to pass until they had 
agreed to what the agents wanted to levy. Not surprisingly, given the influence of the 
principals, “almost all” such disputes were being resolved “in favour of the customs”.102 
French officials always saw such behaviour as simple exactions, and undoubtedly 
many agents or sub-farmers did demand extra when they thought they could get away 
with it. But more was going on here than the “ferocious and systematic” public banditry 
Moura deplored. For the first thirty years of Norodom’s rule, few financial institutions 
existed in Cambodia apart from private usury or advances on harvests from Chinese 
merchants in Phnom Penh, acting on their own account or as agents for firms in 
Saigon, Cholon or even as far away as Singapore.103 The expansion of revenue farming 
under Norodom, however, made available a new and growing source of finance. Early 
profits not only funded the acquisition of other revenue farms, but the very existence of 
this new source of liquidity may have fuelled the mid-1870s pressure on Norodom to 
create more monopolies for auction. At the time, revenue farm shares were the only 
legally protected investments in Cambodia, as property rights in land did not exist 
before the 1884 Convention; and these considerations surely influenced the investment 
decisions of wealthy Phnom Penh Chinese, from the 1860s to the mid-1880s at least. 
Once in operation, however, this intricate web of financial dealings was peculiarly 
vulnerable, and stood or fell on the provision of continuous cash flow. Monopolists and 
sub-farmers alike were contractually obliged to make stipulated monthly payments, and 
contracts could be legally cancelled if payments fell behind by more than a month or 
two.104 Insurance against loss or misfortune was thus essential, and in this respect the 
provision of cash deposits in advance played a critical role. In 1882, Octave Vandelet, 
one of three French principals in the opium and alcohol farm of 1882–84,105 tried to 
explain how revenue farming operations worked to Fourès, the acting protectorate 
representative. Fourès had requested that Vandelet deposit with the protectorate the 
40,000 piastres in bond money advanced from his regional sub-farmers for alcohol, as 
sureties against future repayments. Vandelet refused, as the money had already been 
committed commercially elsewhere. This situation was hardly unusual, he explained; 
his predecessor in the farm, A Foune, and all the other Chinese, acted in exactly the 
same way, as did the regional sub-farmers of rice wine to whom his company had sold 
shares in the monopoly. They would have already recouped their initial outlays to him 
from advances made by their provincial sub-farmers, and would those sub-farmers, 
right down to the lowest level of shareholder.106  
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If advances provided the credit mechanism without which the revenue farms 
themselves could not exist, these advances needed to be quickly recouped and 
profitably reinvested, to help protect the essential cash flow without which the whole 
structure would collapse. At every level, therefore, investors pressured those below to 
make payments on time and in full, especially when the initial cost of the monopolies 
soared exorbitantly in the later 1880s. Apart from the opium farm, which never solved 
its smuggling problem, when revenue farms failed it was usually because a bad 
harvest, rebellion, or some other calamity had interrupted cash flow at source. While 
successful revenue farmers sought to mitigate this problem by spreading their 
investments across other ventures, the strategy could also bring its own problems if the 
other exploitations failed. In 1877–78, something like this seems to have happened to 
the eight-man opium farming syndicate of Cambodia, headed at the time by the 
principal opium farmers of Cochinchina, A Pan, “Tang Ken Ho” [Tan Keng Ho],107 and 
Gan Wee Tin,108 the latter referred to in almost all French archival documents under his 
company trading name of Ban Hap. To understand the probable cause of events of 
1877–78 in Cambodia, we need to know something about one of the major investors, 
the Ban Hap Company, in earlier years. 
Gan Wee Tin, Tan Keng Ho, and Tan’s brothers were Singapore Straits Chinese of 
Fujianese (Hokkien) origin with long business associations with Vietnam. Ban Hap and 
Company had been opium farmers in southern Vietnam during the 1850s, according to 
an 1867 letter the company sent to the Cochinchina Director of the Interior. It described 
them as the “former opium farmers in the eastern provinces [that is, before the French 
conquest of 1858–62] and opium farmers in the three western provinces [of 
Cochinchina until 1867] when they belonged to the Annamite Government”.109 Although 
successfully tendering for the new combined opium monopoly of Cochinchina in 1869, a 
few years later an economic downturn and consequent fall in opium consumption, both 
exacerbated by the company’s own lax business practices, saw it lose all access to 
credit and plunge towards bankruptcy. Several local and Singaporean Chinese interests 
owned substantial shares in the Ban Hap opium farm. Easy access to its early profits 
had seen many of them, along with the opium farm managers themselves, “speculate 
with the revenues in ready cash”, in this case using the farm’s profits, as well as 
advances, as a source of commercial credit. As the well connected Andrew Spooner 
informed the admiral-governor’s appalled Privy Council in March 1874:110  
 
Until this very day, funds lodged in the opium farm have been used by the managers to 
defraud the Company and to allow them to trade in rice, wood, and contraband opium at 
the expense of their associates. The capital invested has been used for other purposes 
and can no longer be found [as] the accounts have never been kept properly.  
 
By 1874, however, the company’s capital investments, and the large number of 
Chinese and French businesses exposed to or dependant on them, made its imminent 
collapse political dynamite for the colonial administration. As a result, an unhappy 
Cochinchina government felt compelled to draw up more than one rescue package for 
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Ban Hap and his partners in the mid-1870s, if only to enable the shaky company to 
remain sufficiently creditworthy in Hong Kong and Singapore to trade its way out of 
trouble locally.111 In November 1876, a new consortium including some of the leading 
Ban Hap associates, took up the Cambodian opium farm contract. But within a year, the 
syndicate embarked on a calculated process of swindling Norodom out of the revenue 
farm repayments, most probably as a deliberate attempt to shore up more important 
investments elsewhere.  
The story began in November 1877, when the opium and alcohol farm requested 
reimbursement of 2000 silver bars from the royal treasury, to compensate for purported 
losses in eastern Cambodia after a brief incursion by Sivotha earlier that year. The 
claim was clearly fraudulent: Moura had toured the affected areas at the time and seen 
“the opium outlets and others farms” operating normally, as he later reported.112 
Nevertheless, shortly after the company ceased its monthly payments. By mid-January 
1878, when Moura first became involved, its arrears were 1245 silver bars and 
climbing. His enquiries revealed that the consortium had ordered the farm manager, 
“more and more stridently, to resist all [treasury] demands” for payment, even though 
the money was on hand. Then a French employee reported the owners were systema-
tically stripping the farm’s assets, including the cash that was being sent “to Saigon on 
all the scheduled boats”. The company’s plan was to “survive, without great cost”, any 
seizure of the farm arising from its policy of pushing the Cambodian government “to the 
extreme”, he revealed. When Norodom finally sought Moura’s help against the principal 
farmers, who were all residents of Cochinchina, he had received no payments for three 
months from the farm that supplied one-third of his revenues. Although the Cochinchina 
governor was officially requested to bring the fraudsters to justice there, it proved 
impossible, thanks to Norodom’s own standard contractual clause that required revenue 
farm disputes be settled by Cambodian courts. Unfortunately for the king’s case, the 
notorious venality of the unpaid Cambodian judiciary worked in favour of the delinquent 
consortium, which had bought up the judges in advance from the profits accrued while 
running the monopoly solely for its own benefit.113  
Rumours had been circulating at the time that the French intended to take over the 
Cambodian opium farm, so perhaps the principal consortium investors believed they 
had no future in Cambodia and acted accordingly; but it seems more likely that financial 
difficulties elsewhere lured them down this dangerous path. Whatever the case, they 
forfeited any chance of future business dealings with Norodom. Although a former 
Chinese opium monopolist, A Foune, bought up the unexpired contract, in 1881 
Norodom decided to sell the opium and rice wine farm to a private French company 
(Vandelet and Dussitour), despite local Chinese opposition.114 It is hard to imagine that 
this late 1870s experience did not play some part in his decision. 
Although extant archival records are far from complete—and in any case only 
contain part of the story—it does seem that the opium farm fraud of 1877–78 was a 
genuine aberration in what was usually a far more symbiotic relationship between 
Norodom and his Chinese revenue farmers, among whom the most successful had 
their principal residences in Phnom Penh. We conclude with two of the most profitable 
of these businesses in the 1880s, both operated by Cantonese. One was run by a man 
known variously in the archives as “A Chap”, “Luy Chap”, “Lưu Chap”, and, to 
Norodom,  as “Thauke  Chap”.115  The other was  the well-known  and  long-established  
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Cochinchinese firm of Wang Tai, founded by Cheung Ah Lum (Zhang Peilin)116 who, 
like Gan Wee Tin, was known to the French by his business chop as “Wangtai”. In both 
cases, success rested on their being locally established, with Lưu Chap and a son of 
Cheung Ah Lum both setting up residences in Phnom Penh from at least the early 
1880s. Although the evidence is sparse, Chap may even have originally come to 
Cambodia with the Wang Tai firm. The company’s first appearance in the archives was 
in 1879, when Cheung Ah Lum approached Norodom for permission to set up a 
pawnshop in Phnom Penh, using the same rules and rates as in Saigon and Cholon. 
Norodom and Étienne Aymonier both agreed, although at the time the protectorate 
representative only knew of Wangtai by reputation, as a Saigon businessman and head 
of its Cantonese congrégation (the French name for the obligatory organisation of 
Chinese into dialect groups that had originated under the Nguyễn).117 Lưu Chap’s name 
first appeared in the archival records in 1882, where he was described as “the public 
cashier and accountant at the pawnshop”,118 suggesting Chap was either an employee 
of, or shareholder in, the Wangtai exploitation. 
By the early 1880s, the Cantonese born Zhang Peilin had lived in Cochinchina for 
about twenty years. In 1860, his Macau-based company had built a number of junks for 
the new French colonial administration. After delivering them in person in 1862, Zhang 
had decided to remain. He moved early into construction, setting up the first brick kilns 
and erecting a number of western-style buildings that were rented to the administration 
and to the Chamber of Commerce, of which he was an early member. In 1879, when 
his company opened the Phnom Penh pawnshop, Zhang had been appointed to the 
China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company that exported rice to China.119 By the 
1880s, he was also a major Saigon landlord and proprietor of an unsanitary complex (la 
cité Wang-tai) that jumbled poor Chinese immigrants in together with chickens, ducks, 
fruit, and other imported produce.120 
 By 1882, when Lưu Chap’s name entered the archival record, this employee or 
associate of Wangtai was already an important member of the Phnom Penh Cantonese 
community, described as “a farmer of several taxes and a familiar of the king, from 
whom he had recently won more than 1500 piastres at gambling”. At the time Chap had 
no official title and was not even a merchant, Fourès reported, but merely the 
pawnshop’s public cashier and accountant. Even so, he had amassed enough money 
to fund a feast and dragon procession through the capital’s streets in March that year, 
something that suggests the way revenue farming was already rivalling commerce as a 
source of local Chinese wealth and status. When Cantonese revellers created 
disturbances during the festivities, a sequence of events ensued that culminated some 
days later with Fourès locking up Chéang Wat, the head of the Phnom Penh Cantonese 
congregation, and Lưu Chap. Significantly, however, when “the leading Chinese of 
Phnom Penh [came] to act as guarantors of public order” to obtain the men’s release, 
Chap was their only concern and they willingly paid a 5000 piastre bond on his 
account.121 Almost immediately after, Chap appeared in the reports again, after offering 
the French opium farmer, Vandelet, 1000 silver bars (about 16,000 piastres) for the 
opium sub-farm of Phnom Penh.122  
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The most likely explanation for this otherwise meteoric rise seems that Chap had 
been acting as a front man for other investors, probably including Zhang Peilin and his 
associates but possibly Cambodian court figures as well. Buying access to the palace, 
and to Norodom’s inner circle, could not have been cheap; but as an investment in royal 
patronage it was a shrewd move, for Norodom’s cronies often figured among those 
awarded revenue farm contracts (at least, for whom records survive).123 One such case 
was A Gi, the Hainanese head of Norodom’s kitchen staff and an opium-smoking royal 
crony. So useful was he that Vandelet and Dussitour had once hoped to make Gi an 
associate in their own opium farm, in the hope of using him to recruit Hainanese sub-
farmers or employees for the exploitation.124 Later, at a delicate point in these 
negotiations, Dussitour had also solicited a brother of Gan Wee Tin in Saigon to write 
on their behalf seeking Gi’s support for the French firm.125 By 1884 A Gi had been 
elected head of the Phnom Penh Hainan congrégation and appointed revenue farmer of 
fisheries in four provinces in the Great Lake area, at the price of 945 silver bars.126 But 
as if to illustrate the potential peril in Chinese over-reliance on Norodom’s favour for 
protection, Gi’s career ended abruptly in March 1886, when he was stabbed to death 
within the palace complex for reasons no one could officially discover.127 
Chap never incurred this sort of physical danger, although in 1884 he had suffered 
a real financial setback when he bought what should have been a gold-plated invest-
ment, the Phnom Penh concession for the lottery of thirty-six animals. Jean Moura had 
abolished this lottery some time in the mid-to-later 1870s, and Phnom Penh Chinese 
businessmen had been trying to wheedle Norodom into re-establishing it from at least 
1881.128 The thirty-six animals’ lottery was a guaranteed bonanza because, unlike many 
other revenue farms that taxed the consumption preferences and pastimes of Chinese 
or Vietnamese alone, large numbers of ordinary Khmer in the interior were “fanatical 
about the game”.129 This was undoubtedly why Moura had banned it. But in August 
1883 Norodom sold a two-year, countrywide monopoly on this lottery to Foc Yao in 
return for 4050 silver bars (or 60,000 piastres), one thousand of which, as we saw 
earlier, were paid in advance as deposit.130 Foc Yao quickly subdivided the monopoly 
and, some time before the end of 1883, Chap bought the Phnom Penh sub-farm for 
1000 silver bars. In late December, however, the Cochinchina governor changed his 
mind about allowing the return of such a pernicious farm and insisted Norodom break 
the contract. Nothing happened; so when Chap begun operations on New Year’s Day, 
1884, the protectorate promptly closed him down and he lost his 16,000 piastre 
investment.  
 Chap later recovered from this setback, perhaps with some assistance from the 
Wang Tai Company, which had also stumbled in 1881. Norodom had sold it the 
monopoly of rice wine, gambling, and pig slaughtering for 3000 bars annually, with an 
                                                 
123
 Indeed, in 1880 Aymonier was privately told that Norodom kept himself at arm’s length from the revenue 
farming system at the time and instead allowed a small number of court favourites to form an association to 
sell the sub-farming rights to various taxes. Letter of 14 June 1880, AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 12603. 
124
 ProtRep to GovCC, letter of 31 May 1881. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 13427. 
125
 Telegram of 26 August 1881. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 13427. 
126
 List of successful bidders, dated 2 Sept 1884. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 12694. 
127
 Lt General Badens reported a number of possibilities, including that A Gi had refused  marriage offers for 
his daughter from both the king and a prince; and that he had lost Norodom’s favour during the insurrection by 
moving to support the French position. ResGen to GovCC, March 1886. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 10054. 
128
 ProtRep to GovCC, telegram of 6 Aug 1881; and letter of 7 Aug 1881. Both AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 10054 
129
 It “set in motion the most dreadful consequences” whenever it was authorised, according to Resident 
General Picquet. Resident General Begin also agreed. See ProtRep to GovCC, letter of 10 June 1887 AOMI, 
Fonds amiraux, 9222. 
130
 ProtRep to GovCC, letter of 19 Nov 1883. AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 13460. This only says “the Chinese” had 
made the offer, but Foc Yao was later identified in an undated 1886 note from ResGen Bégin to the GovCC, 
AOMI, Fonds amiraux, 10278.  
Cooke, Norodom’s Revenue Farming System 
 
53 
 
 
 
 
advance of 10,000 piastres, only to demand the contract be annulled ten months later 
when he received a higher offer.131 Soon after, in 1882, the king awarded Wang Tai the 
lucrative fisheries monopoly near the Tonle Sap Great Lake for a mere 3000 bars,132 
probably as form of compensation for the earlier cancellation, since he had made or 
offered similar gestures to disappointed farmers on other occasions. Norodom knew 
perfectly well how important it was to maintain good relations with his principal farmers. 
Although the company failed to win the fisheries concession with the same bid in 1883, 
the first year it was put up to open tender, it did successfully join with two other Phnom 
Penh Cantonese—one of whom, Lo Yu, was reportedly associated with the Heaven and 
Earth Society—to secure the countrywide monopoly for the import, production, and sale 
of rice wine, from 1884 to 1886.133 In 1885, however, the local Cantonese congregation 
split into two factions, one headed by the resident son of Zhang Peilin134 and the other 
by the same Lo Yu. This factional rivalry probably led Lo Yu to sell his share in the 
exploitation some time after that, and to use his secret society contacts to revenge 
himself on his rival, because by early 1887 the Wang Tai farm was in serious trouble 
from illegal competitors and needed to find funds from elsewhere to survive.135 At this 
critical juncture the Wang Tai Company turned to Lưu Chap. 
 By then, Chap was flourishing once more, thanks to his position as one of Noro-
dom’s cronies. In later 1884, in violation of the convention of July that year, the king had 
secretly signed a contract to transfer to Chap the monopoly right to the countrywide 
farm of gambling and pig slaughtering, and to the Phnom Penh pawnshop, for 3750 
silver bars (or 58,125 piastres).136 No doubt aware of the illegality involved, Chap had 
quickly on-sold the pawnshop concession to three other Cantonese, one of them a 
resident of Cochinchina, for a tidy profit (125 silver bars, after paying only 75 himself). 
The presence of a French subject (the Cochinchinese resident) in the syndicate then 
stimulated protracted legal and administrative wrangling throughout 1885, as lawyers 
and officials thrashed out the situation, while all farms continued to operate and make 
their payments to the king. Finally, the French decided to accredit the pawnshop 
monopoly, provided its payments henceforth went to the protectorate rather than to 
Norodom. Not long after, the precedent was quietly applied to Chap, who was 
recognised as revenue farmer for gambling and pig slaughtering.137 Chap’s gamble with 
Norodom had paid off handsomely and, although his attempt to retain the combined 
gambling, abattoir and pawnshop farm failed in 1887,138 he was still able to exploit 
Norodom’s confidence to help rescue the Wang Tai alcohol monopoly.   
 The Cantonese businessmen’s plan was simple but daring: to have the thirty-six 
animals’ lottery reinstated, with themselves as its monopolists, and, for a while, they 
managed to pull it off. The return of the lottery was a cause célèbre at the time. On the 
French side, Governor-General Richaud was appalled to find that Resident General de 
Chapeaux had, for whatever reason, deliberately deceived him about it;139 while on the  
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Cambodian side the former excesses erupted once more, with gambling fever sweeping 
all levels of society and people being reduced to debt bondage by their addiction to the  
lottery.140 In the circumstances, it seems likely that Lưu Chap and Zhang Peilin’s firm 
had speedily on-sold most of their rights to the lottery, foreseeing its inevitable 
prohibition by the French, because the Wang Tai Company’s rice wine farm 
subsequently pulled back from disaster and continued to exploit its monopoly 
throughout the later 1880s.  
As the reinstatement of the thirty-six animals’ lottery in 1887 shows, Lưu Chap, who 
may have begun in Cambodia as a Wang Tai subordinate, was by then its equal locally. 
While managing his revenue farms ably must obviously have played a part in this 
success, much of it had surely also depended on Chap’s personal ability to maintain his 
position as a royal crony at a time when such connections, and a willingness to sign 
secret contracts and grease the tender process with “customary gifts”, ensured 
Norodom’s continued goodwill. With few important external connections to distract him, 
unlike the Cochinchinese-based Hokkien opium farmers of the later 1870s, Chap was 
able to exploit the centrality of the monarch in the Cambodian revenue farming system 
by focusing on retaining Norodom’s good will. In the later 1880s he demonstrated this 
awareness by accepting secret royal contracts that significantly increased the cost of 
running his revenue farms; but, in return, by the early 1890s he had become as 
dominant in the Cambodian revenue farming system as the Ban Hap Company had 
been in early-1870s Cochinchina. As Resident Superior de Vernéville recognised, Chap 
was the pivot around which the new fiscal system, to be introduced in 1892, would turn, 
because “all the main taxes” were in his hands.141 So important was it by then to retain 
his capital for local investment that the resident superior personally offered to broker a 
new contract between him and Norodom after the king’s escalating demands for 
additional payments finally overwhelmed Chap’s ability to pay in 1891.142  
According to information in the French archival records, Lưu Chap was probably the 
most successful Chinese entrepreneur produced by Norodom’s revenue farming 
system. Whether he could have maintained his position and met the challenges of the 
post-1892 business environment will never be known, as he died in 1894. However, he 
might well have made the transition, for in 1891 he had already begun to move in a new 
direction, one with great commercial potential. In partnership with “Thaoke” Pak Man, 
Chap had become the general fisheries farmer meaning he had secured the monopoly 
rights over all rentable Cambodian fisheries for the next three years. By this move, he 
had become involved in the most significant Cambodian export industry of the time.143 
Although his widow saw out the lucrative contract, neither she nor any son was 
identified thereafter in any colonial records that I have seen to date. Given Chap’s 
wealth and contacts, there is no reason to suppose he might not have continued 
successfully in this business until the general fisheries revenue farm was finally 
abolished in 1908. In that year, the new Resident Superior, Paul Luce, took advantage 
of a Chinese cartel’s low bid for the monopoly in 1906, and again in 1908, to summarily 
abolish this last major revenue farm and replace it by a combination of leasing fees and 
direct taxation on fishing equipment. Ironically, by then the revenue farm on fisheries 
appeared in French eyes as an outmoded relic of the traditional Cambodian fiscal 
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system rather than what it actually was, a new creation by King Norodom of less than 
thirty years’ standing.144 
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